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Theory predicts that the eﬀects of search frictions on house prices from temporary
movements in demand should be temporary, while the data suggests it is permanent.
The latter implies that movements in demand coupled with search frictions create
higher volatility in prices than theory would predict, amplifying price changes, leading
to bubbles and depressions. To generate permanent price changes from temporary
demand shocks, a textbook search model is combined with a behavioral assumption
where house buyers and sellers ignore the eﬀects of search frictions on past prices. The
estimated model implies that over half of the real price growth from the housing bubble
starting in 1998 is due to the behavioral assumption where households are ‘Fooled by
Search.’ When trend growth of prices is removed, the behavioral assumption explains
almost three-fourths of the housing bubble.
The estimated model also provides several other results. (1) There is a large ineﬃ-
ciency in the search process of the housing market: buyers have very little bargaining
power relative to their impact on creating sales, i.e. the Hosios condition is not met
by an order of magnitude. (2) There is evidence of a rise in the fundamental value of
houses from 1998 to 2005 that mirrors the loose monetary policy under the Greenspan
Federal Reserve. (3) Analysis of the boom and bust of the housing market from 1975
to 1982 suggests that buyers who are choosing to not enter the housing market are
rational. Using the last observation to make a back of the envelope projection for the
current crisis, turnover will have to fall to its 1982 level and remain there until 2011
before a recovery can begin, driving house prices down to their real levels of 2002-2003.
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In the housing market, people ......just do not know how to judge the overall
level of prices. Much more salient in their minds is the rate of increase of
prices.
Robert J. Shiller Irrational Exuberance, 2nd Ed., 2005. p. 208
Theory predicts that the eﬀects of search frictions on house prices from temporary
movements in demand should be temporary, while the data suggests it is permanent.
The latter implies that movements in demand coupled with search frictions create higher
volatility in prices than theory would predict amplifying price changes, leading to bubbles
and depressions. To generate permanent price changes from temporary demand shocks, a
textbook search model is combined with a behavioral assumption where house buyers and
sellers ignore the eﬀects of search frictions on past prices. The estimated model implies
that over half of the real price growth from the housing bubble starting in 1998 is due to
the behavioral assumption where households are ‘Fooled by Search.’ When trend growth of
prices is removed, the behavioral assumption explains almost three-fourths of the housing
bubble. Furthermore, the estimated model implies that there is a large ineﬃciency in the
search process of the housing market: buyers have very little bargaining power relative to
their impact on creating sales, i.e. the Hosios (1990) condition is not met by an order of
magnitude.
Search theory models the diﬃculties with which buyers and sellers have in ﬁnding,
or ‘searching’ for each other, in order to make a trade. These diﬃculties are the ‘search
frictions’ that are without a doubt present in the housing market.1 An increase in relative
demand, deﬁned as the number of buyers to sellers, or market tightness, makes it easier
for a seller to ﬁnd a buyer. This raises the amount of sales and it also raises the price,
since sellers know that it is easier to ﬁnd another buyer–the search frictions for sellers
have decreased. Search theory thus predicts a positive relationship between sales (or
turnover2) and prices when shocks to demand drive the market.3 However, search theory,
like standard Walrasian Theory, predicts that demand should be related to the price level.
We now arrive at Shiller’s quote. Shiller states that the market participants in the
housing market “just do not know how to judge the overall level of prices.” Figure 1 is
essentially Shiller’s quote put into graphical form. The immediate striking feature is the
tremendously high real house price level around 2005. The high price level is the housing
bubble that is at the heart of the current troubles of the economy as well as the ‘Irrational
Exuberance’ that is the topic of Shiller’s prophetic text. Shiller states in two paragraphs
before the opening quote that
1Search frictions, along with transactions costs have often been argued to explain the ineﬃciency in the
housing market documented by Case and Shiller (1989).
2Turnover is simply sales normalized by the stock, in this case the stock of homes.
3Note that increases in supply would raise turnover and lower prices, creating a negative correlation
between turnover and house prices.







































Figure 1: Annual Real House Price Growth, Annual Detrended Real House
Price Level and Turnover Both the house price growth and turnover are deviations
from means. The real price level is the percent deviation from a log-linear trend. The left
scale is for prices, while the right is for turnover. The years 1976 to 2003 were used to
calculate the means and the log-linear trend. The data is made real by deﬂating by the
GDP Deﬂator. Source: OFHEO, BEA, NAR and Census SOC and CPS/HV.
2The housing market levels we have seen recently are not, as so many imagine,
the outcome only of fundamental forces aﬀecting the rational demand for and
supply of housing.
He believes that something non-fundamental is driving the irrationally high house prices.
But he does go on to state that “of course home prices are set by the forces of supply and
demand, ...the prices have to clear the market.” In ﬁgure 1 we can see quite clearly the
laws of supply and demand at work. Turnover, deﬁned as house sales4 over the total owner
housing stock5 moves very closely with real housing price growth. The correlation of the
two series is 0.89 and the R2 from a simple OLS regression of price growth on turnover
is 0.79.6 It appears that movements in housing demand cause both sales to increase and
prices to rise. It would seem at ﬁrst glance that fundamental forces are indeed working
quite well.
But, as stated above, and to be ﬂeshed out further below, theory predicts a relationship
between turnover and the price level, not price growth. The data are not friendly to the
theory. We easily see in ﬁgure 1 that turnover moves with price growth not the price level.
Note that this is not an implication from the relative magnitudes of the curves, rather, it
is the diﬀerence in the timing of the peaks and valleys of the curves: the price level lags
turnover, while price growth and turnover move together.
The data imply that a temporary increase in turnover above its long-run level raises
prices permanently. Furthermore, a permanent increase in turnover results in a permanent
increase in the growth rate of prices. To see this in the data, in ﬁgure 1, examine the
period from 1998 to 2002. We see that turnover rose above its long-run level and stayed
there for three years. In those same years we see an approximate permanent change in
the growth of detrended prices from zero, being on trend, to something much larger. We
are getting a disagreement between theory and data. Theory predicts that demand should
aﬀect the price level while the data say demand aﬀects price growth.
This confusion between growth in prices and the price level is Shiller’s observation in
his quote at the start of this paper. People seem to have very little idea about what price
levels should be. Instead they seem to have a much better idea about what should be
happening to price growth, or in Shiller’s words, ‘the rate of increase of prices.’
Theory can be reconciled with data by assuming that current market participants
are indeed aﬀected by search frictions in setting prices, but when trying to elucidate the
‘fundamental’ from past prices, they ignore the eﬀect of search frictions on past prices.
In other words, households have a diﬃcult time understanding and interpreting what
the price level means. They ignore that the past price level may have been high due
4Both new and existing, single family.
5Consists of owner-occupied houses and vacant houses for sale from the Census Housing Vacancy survey
which is a part of the CPS.
6This high explanatory power of turnover for price growth is mentioned in footnote 5 in Ortalo-Magn´ e
and Rady (2006) and by Wheaton at the 2009 annual meetings in a presentation of a revision of Wheaton
and Lee (2008).
3to a combination of search frictions and past high demand. Instead, they are fooled
into thinking that there has been a permanent change in the value of a house. Under
this assumption, buyers and sellers bargain over the price level relative to past prices,
regardless of what past demand was.7 As a result, buyers and sellers bargain over price
growth not the price level. The price change that is then induced by current demand and
search frictions, goes on to become permanent from future market participants ignorance
of past search frictions on prices.
The behavioral ineﬃciency is introduced into a textbook search model with bargaining.
The model consists of a stationary set of buyers and sellers. A house is simply an asset from
which buyers derive utility and sellers can produce at zero cost. There is a fundamental
value to the house that determines the lifetime utility that buyers receive from owning
the asset, however, the level of the fundamental value is unknown. The model assumes
that buyers and sellers determine the fundamental value of a house from past prices.
However, a behavioral ineﬃciency is introduced where, when calculating the fundamental
value of a house from past prices, buyers and sellers irrationally ignore that past prices are
inﬂuenced by search frictions. A stationary version of the model is linearized generating
a linear relationship between price growth and turnover. The model is estimated using
standard OLS where each annual observation in the data from 1975-2007 is treated as
an independent observation of the stationary model. The argument is that from week to
week, buyers and sellers in the housing market treat the measure of buyers to sellers as
essentially ﬁxed. There is no modelling of the entry decision of buyers and sellers. The
estimated model explains 78.77% of the annual movements in house price growth and
80.35% of the movements in the detrended house price level.
From the estimated model, counterfactuals can be generated where the behavioral
ineﬃciency has been removed. Figure 2 plots the realized house price level from 1998
(normalized by the 1998 price), along with the counterfactual and the trend price level.8
In the data, house prices peaked in 2006, after having appreciated 45.26% since 1998. In
the counterfactual, house prices peak one year earlier, in 2005, only having appreciated
21.41%. This implies that the behavioral ineﬃciency caused prices to rise an extra 23.84%,
or 52.67% of the total increae. In other words, the behavioral ineﬃciency explains over
half of the house price bubble. When the trend growth of prices is removed, the data peaks
at 25.19% above trend, while the counterfactual peaks at 6.93% above trend. Relative to
the trend the ineﬃciency explains 72.48%, or almost three-fourths, of the bubble.
Note that the model is not explaining the cause of the bubble.9 The ultimate cause
lies in the reasons that turnover increased so much. Rather, the mechanism is only an
7The eﬃcient markets theory, Fama (1970), can be thought of as rationalizing buyers’ and sellers’ use
of past market prices as a signal of the fundamental value. Behavioral economics, Tversky and Kahneman
(1974), then argues that buyers and sellers use the past market prices as an anchor in their negotiating.
8The trend is based upon average annual growth from 1976 to 2003.
9For an overview of bubbles see Kindleberger’s Manias, Panics and Crashes and Shiller’s Irrational
Exuberance. For an overview of theoretical modelling of bubbles see Brunnermeier (2008).

































Figure 2: Housing Bubble Annual Real House Price Level: Data, Counterfactual from
Estimated Model where Irrational Assumption has been removed, along with estimated
trend. Data Source: OFHEO.
ampliﬁcation device given the observed path for turnover. However, Shiller hypothesizes
in Irrational Exuberance that households respond to changes in growth rates, creating
positive feedbacks. The behavioral ineﬃciency here causes what should be level eﬀects
to become growth eﬀects, which then can cause positive feedback into turnover under
Shiller’s hypothesis.
The estimated model has three other interesting results. First, the underlying search
process in the housing market is ineﬃcient. As stated by Hosios (1990), the eﬃciency
condition for a search model is that the weight on buyers in the matching function should
be equal to the bargaining weight on buyers.10 Essentially, the ‘Hosios Condition’ equates
the social return of a buyer searching, given by how the buyer’s action contributes to
creating a match, to the buyer’s private return. Given the estimate of the model, in
order for the search model to be eﬃcient (ignoring the ineﬃciency from the behavioral
assumption) households have to discount the future at an annual rate of, at a minimum,
over 40%. Such a high level of impatience seems implausible, so that the search frictions
in the housing market are ineﬃcient by an order of magnitude.
Second, the estimated model identiﬁes an increase in the fundamental value of housing
starting in 1998, peaking in 2003-2005, and then falling back down to its 1998 level by
10That is, the bargaining weight from the generalized Nash Solution, which is used in the model to
represent the bargaining between buyers and sellers.
52007. This time period roughly coincides with the period of relatively loose monetary
policy under the Greenspan Federal Reserve. It is after this rise that we see turnover
really take oﬀ in the housing market. In a rational model, the increase in turnover should
have only caused a slight increase in the price level relative to trend (only approximately
7%). But to the contrary, the estimated irrational model implies that that households take
the temporary rise in turnover and treat it as permanent, so that as turnover remains high,
prices keep on rising. In essence, the irrational assumption is an ampliﬁcation eﬀect that
magniﬁes the eﬀect of the loose monetary policy on house prices. It is the irrationality
ineﬃciency that potentially makes the error in monetary policy be quite painful.
Third, examination of the 1975-1982 boom and bust in the housing market suggests
that the buyers who are choosing to not enter the housing market are behaving somewhat
rationally. In comparing the counterfactual price level with the price level in the data, we
see that whenever the counterfactual price is above the price in the data, that turnover
is increasing. However, once the counterfactual price falls below the price in the data,
turnover falls, and keeps on falling until the price in the data is driven down to the
counterfactual price. This suggests that potential buyers do respond to the price level.
They understand when prices are overvalued and remain out of the market until prices
fall.11
We can use the results from the 1975-1982 housing market to make a projection for
the current housing crisis. In the estimated model, the counterfactual price was above the
price in the data until 2004.12 It is then in 2005 that turnover peaks as the counterfactual
starts to fall below the price in the data. Ever since then, turnover has been falling, as the
price in the data has remained above the counterfactual price. As turnover remains low,
the price in the data will fall more than the counterfactual. We can then ask the question:
what paths for turnover can drive the price in the data down to the counterfactual? The
answer to that question can give a prediction for how severe and long we can expect the
housing crisis to be. I ﬁrst show that a bust of the same size of the 1982 bust in housing will
not deliver this. I then show that turnover falling to the lowest level of the 1982 bust and
remaining there for 2009-2011, will deliver the result. Therefore, a back of the envelope
calculation using the estimated model suggests that there are a couple more years of very
depressed activity in the housing market. The model predicts that once prices stop falling
they will have fallen back to their real levels in 2002-2003. Of course, nominal values may
be more important, but that depends upon what happens to inﬂation or deﬂation.
A word about the signiﬁcance of the results, the main result of the paper is the very
high correlation between house price growth and turnover. This restriction should be
thought of as litmus test for housing models that attempt the much harder and nobler
task of endogenizing turnover and prices. As is covered in a separate section later in this
11This suggest informed and uninformed agents as in the model of a bubble by Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2003).
12Note that the counterfactual includes the estimated shock to the fundamental value of a house from
1998-2005 that is potentially attributed to the Greenspan Fed.
6paper, without endogenizing turnover, there is no way to distinguish the irrational model
from a rational model where deviations in turnover from the long-run mean are correlated
with permanent changes in the value of a house. Additionally, regional, metropolitan and
other countries’ data need to be analyzed to uncover the robustness of the high correlation
between turnover (or any measure of a sales rate) and price growth.
The strong relationship between turnover and prices was ﬁrst illustrated in Stein
(1995). Subsequently, papers by Berkovec and Goodman (1996), Ortalo-Magn´ e and Rady
(2004), Andrew and Meen (2003), Leung, Lau and Leong (2002) and Wheaton and Lee
(2008) have conﬁrmed the results. None of these papers focuses on the diﬀerence between
the price level versus price growth.13
One line of thought to explain the relationship between turnover and sales is the search
context used in this paper. The ﬁrst search model of housing is Wheaton (1990). The
model in Williams (1995) is very close to the model in this paper, and is the ﬁrst paper to
consider aggregate uncertainty. Since then several papers have developed search models to
explain the general relationship, notably, Berkovec and Goodman (1996), Krainer (2001),
Novy-Marx (forthcoming), Leung and Zhang (2007), Ngai and Tenreyo (2008) and D´ ıaz
and Jerez (2008). With the exception of Ngai and Tenreyo (2008) and D´ ıaz and Jerez
(2008), none of these papers confront the empirical predictions of the model with the
data. None of these papers examines the implications for the model regarding the rela-
tionship between turnover and price growth versus price levels. The paper by Berkovec
and Goodman (1996) is very interesting, sharing similar features to the irrational model
in this paper, such as a backward looking element for price setting similar to this paper.
However, they assume an equation for the slow adjustment of prices, not placing it in a
microfounded theory of why prices are backward looking. Furthermore, they assume that
sellers do not know the current level of market tightness. Last, the paper by Albrecht,
Anderson, Smith and Vromer (2007) shares several modelling features with the model
of this paper, but they look at the implications of impatient buyers and sellers on price
dispersion and time on the market in a stationary environment.
Another idea besides search frictions to explain the high correlation between turnover
and prices,14 ﬁrst put forth by Stein (1995), is that households face a down payment
constraint to buy a home. When prices fall, current homeowners have less equity that
they can then apply to buy a bigger house, so that turnover also falls. This idea has
been quite nicely put into a dynamic OLG setting by Ortalo-Magn´ e and Rady (2006).15
Several authors have been taking the search and the credit constraint theories and tried
to see which is more important.16 I do not see these theories as competing, rather, they
13Wheaton and Lee (2008) have mentioned the diﬀerence, but their inclusion of lags in their estimation
of levels makes a model in levels equivalent to a model in diﬀerences.
14Also put forth by Genesove and Mayer (2001) and Engelhardt (2003) is nominal loss aversion. In this
case, in a downturn, sellers are reluctant to sell and face nominall losses, so turnover falls.
15Further work by Sanchez -Marcos and R´ ıos-Rull (2007) has tried to extend the environment of Ortalo-
Magn´ e and Rady (2006).
16See Leung, Lau and Leong (2002), Wheaton and Lee (2008) and Clayton, Miller and Peng (forthcom-
7reinforce each other: prices drive turnover and turnover drives prices. In my opinion, a
model that combines both of these frictions is much closer to reality than a model with
only one such friction.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. First, the simple rational search model
is presented. This is followed by a discussion of the data that is used in estimating the
model. The rational model is then estimated, show the lagging behavior of the price
level to turnover. Next the Irrational model is presented where there is the behavioral
ineﬃciency. The Irrational model is then estimated, showing the very good ﬁt between
turnover and price growth. The Rational and Irrational models are then compared. This
is followed by a discussion of the comparison between the Irrational model and a Rational
model where the deviation of turnover from its mean is related to a permament shock to
the value of a house. There is no way in the data to distinguish these two models from each
other. The implications of the estimated model are then covered. First the ineﬃciency
in the search process is covered. This is followed by the counterfactuals for the housing
bubble from 1998-2006, the estimated shock to the fundamental value of a house during
the years of the loose monetary policy under Greenspan, and then the boom and bust in
the housing market in 1975 to 1982. Finally, projections are made for the current housing
crisis. The last section concludes.
2 Simple Fully Rational Model of Search
2.1 Non-Stochastic Stationary Model Environment
First consider a fully rational stationary model without aggregate uncertainty, holding all
variables ﬁxed. There are two types of agents: buyers and sellers. Time is continuous and
all agents discount the future at rate r. Denote the constant measure of buyers as µB and
of sellers as µS.17 Let y denote the constant expected present discounted value to a buyer
from buying the asset. As detailed below, buyers and sellers meet randomly to trade the
asset at an endogenous price p. The ﬂow utility to the seller from possessing the asset is
normalized to zero.18
The number of matches per unit time between a buyer and a seller is given by the
matching function
m = m(µB,µS).






17No attempt is made in this paper to model the entry decisions of buyers and sellers. Instead, the focus
is on pricing. However, the later counterfactual results do add insight into to how the entry of buyer and
sellers should be modelled.
18This is a normalization. The ﬂow value to a seller could be made positive and the ﬂow value of a buyer
could be modiﬁed to give the same results.





Let θ denote the ratio of buyer to sellers, or market tightness. Further, assume that the
matching function exhibits constant returns to scale. We can then write the selling and
ﬁnding rates as







s(θ) − θs0 (θ) > 0.
This restriction is a suﬃcient condition to ensure that prices are increasing in the ratio of
buyers to sellers.
The value function for a buyer is
rVB = f (y − p − VB), (1)
while that of a seller is
rVS = s(p − VS), (2)
where the dependence of s and f on θ has been suppressed to ease on notation. These
value functions imply that when a buyer and seller make a trade, they never trade again.
To keep the measure of buyers and sellers stable, assume that a succesful buyer and seller
are immediately replaced with another buyer and seller.
When a buyer and seller meet they bargain over the price ˆ p. Here we denote ˆ p as
the price buyers and sellers bargain over, taking prices in potential future matches, p, as
ﬁxed. Assume that the bargaining process can be represented as the solution to a Nash
bargaining problem. The threat point for a buyer is to continue being a buyer, implying
a surplus to the buyer of
SB = y − ˆ p − VB.
The threat point for a seller is to continue being a seller, giving a seller a surplus of
SS = ˆ p − VS.
The total surplus to the trade, S = SB + SS, is given by
S = y − VB − VS.
Let ω be the bargaining power for a buyer. The price setting equation from the Nash
solution satisﬁes
SB = ωS,
9which is given by
y − ˆ p − VB = ω [y − VB − VS].
Doing some re-arranging, we arrive at the following price setting equation
ˆ p = (1 − ω)(y − VB) + ωVS. (3)
A stationary equilibrium is thus p, ˆ p, VB and VS that satisfy equations (1)-(3) and
ˆ p = p. (4)
2.2 Stationary Model Solution










Inserting these into the pricing equation and setting ˆ p = p we get












p = (1 − ω)
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Putting in the dependence of s on θ and using the substitution f = s(θ)/θ we arrive at
the equilibrium pricing equation of
p(θ) =
r + s(θ)
r + s(θ) + ωs(θ)(1/θ − 1)
(1 − ω)y. (5)
It is trivial to show that the price is increasing in the measure of buyers to sellers.
Taking the derivative with respect to θ in equation (5) gives
p0 (θ) =
(s(θ))
2 + rθ2s0 (θ) + r[s(θ) − θs0 (θ)]
θ2 [r + s(θ) + ωs(θ)(1/θ − 1)]
2 ω (1 − ω)y. (6)
Since s0 (θ) > 0 and s(θ) − θs0 (θ) > 0, prices are increasing in the measure of buyers to
sellers.
102.3 Further Model Assumptions and Approximation
This subsection and the next subsection modify the model in order to bring the model
to the data. The empirical strategy that will be employed later is to treat each annual
observation as a stationary observation of the continuous time model. That is, each annual
observation is treated as a steady-state observation where market tightness, θ, and the
fundamental value to owning a house, y, are treated as constants. With the understanding
that we will be using the stationary model solution in the future estimation, this subsection
then modiﬁes the model in order to make an approximation to the stationary model.
The ﬁrst modiﬁcation of the model is to make a simplifying assumption on the matching
technology.




This assumption is standard in the labor search literature. Empirical work in labor
search has failed to reject a constant returns to scale matching function,19 while little
justiﬁcation has been given for the Cobb-Douglass functional form.20 To the author’s
knowledge this issue has not been addressed in the housing search literature. Under this
assumption, the selling rate is
s(θ) = Aθα.
The next modiﬁcations create a point around which to approximate the price for the
empirical analysis. First, assume that market tightness is on average unity.
Assumption 2. On average, market tightness is unity, or
θ = 1.
This is essentially an identifying assumption21 for bringing the model to the data. The
idea is that, in the long run, the measure of buyers is approximately equal to the measure
of sellers.
The last modiﬁcation is to write the fundamental value to owning a house at time
period t as
yt = eztyt
where zt can be thought of as a deviation of the fundamental value of a house from a
long-run trend yt. The following assumptions are made about the behavior of zt and yt.
Assumption 3. On average zt = 0 and yt grows at a constant rate γ so that
yt = (1 + γ)yt−1.
19See the survey by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
20See Shimer (2005).
21Note that this is indeed an identifying assumption and not a normalization. Inspection of equations
(5) and (6) shows that this assumption aﬀects the relationship between r, s and p.
11For now no attempt is made to model a process for zt except that it has mean zero.
These last two modiﬁcations allow for a deﬁnition of the stationary price at time t as
depending upon θt and zt. From equation (5) we get
pt (θt,zt) =
r + s(θt)
r + s(θt) + ωs(θt)(1/θt − 1)
(1 − ω)eztyt. (7)
Deﬁne pt as the stationary price level when θt = 1 and zt = 0. From equation (7) we get
pt = (1 − ω)yt. (8)






ω (θt − 1) + zt

pt (9)
where the condition s(1) = A has been inserted. Equation (9) is the central equation that
will serve as the basis for the later estimations.
3 Data
This section documents the data that is used in estimating the model.
3.1 House Prices
Figure 3 plots the annual real house price since 1975, where the 1975 price has been
normalized to one. The series for house prices is the price index put forth by the Oﬃce
of Federal Housing Enterprice Oversight (OFHEO) divided by the GDP Deﬂator from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).22 Figure 4 plots the annual real house price
appreciation (the 2008 observation is an annualized number from the ﬁrst three quarters
of 2008). The price appreciaton series appears stationary with a mean of 1.81%.23
3.2 Turnover
For turnover I construct a measure of total sales relative to the owner stock of housing,
which I deﬁne below.
22The OFHEO produces their price index from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac conforming mortgages.
There are two indices. One consists of purchase only mortgages, the other consists of all transactioncs
including reﬁnances. The all transactions index goes back to 1975 while the purchase only index goes
back to 1991. The series used in this paper is a combination. From 1975 to the ﬁrst quarter of 1991 the
all transactions index is used. From the second quarter of 1991 on the purchase only index is used. The
purchase only index is slightly smoother in quarterly data, as is evident by the smoother series after 1991
in ﬁgure 3.
23This stationarity was not so obvious before the current downturn, a nice positive externality of the
current problems. The 1.81% includes the annualized observation from the ﬁrst three quarters of 2008.




































Figure 3: Annual Real House Price normalized by 1975 real house price. 2008 is annualized
numbers for ﬁrst three quarters Source: OFHEO and GDP Deﬂator.










Figure 4: Annual Real House Price Appreciation, 2008 is annualized numbers for ﬁrst
three quarters. Source: OFHEO and GDP Deﬂator.
13Owner Stock of Housing As part of the Current Population Survey, Census also surveys
structures and constructs a quarterly series for housing units referred to as the Housing
Vacancy Survey. They break down housing units into owner-occupied, renter-occupied,
vacant for sale, vacant for rent, and several other variables such as vacation and second
homes. I deﬁne the owner stock of housing,2425 or simply the owner stock, as
owner stock = owner occupied housing + vacant houses for sale .
Sales For sales data I combine two series. The ﬁrst is the existing home series published
by the National Association of Realtors (NAR). This series is reported monthly beginning
in 1968. The other series is the new homes sales as reported by the Census Bureau in the
Survey of Construction (SOC). This series is also reported monthly, but starts a bit earlier
in 1963. Both series are for single family units.26 I deﬁne total sales as the combination
of the two and aggregate them quarterly at an annual rate.
Turnover Let turnover be the ratio of total sales to the owner stock. Figure 5 plots
this ratio annually, beginning in 1968 when the existing homes sales data start. The series
appears stationary with a mean of 7.09%. The mean rises slightly when the data before
1975 are excluded to 7.34%.
4 Estimation of the Rational Model
4.1 Data and Stationary Price
Make the following observation regarding the data and the stationary price of the model.
Assumption 4. Each annual observation in the data is an observation of the stationary
price.
The idea is that the current buyers and sellers treat the current level of market tightness
as essentially ﬁxed. The model is about pricing behavior in decentralized trade. This
trading is going on day to day, week to week. The level of market tightness is not adjusting
fast enough to inﬂuence the pricing behavior of the current buyers and sellers.27 Therefore,
current buyers and sellers treat market tightness as ﬁxed. In this spirit, each annual
observation is treated as an observation of the stationary price.
24The series is revised at each decennial census. For those time periods the Census Bureau reports two
values. I reconstruct a consistent series using the growth rates, working backwards from the current period.
Details are shown in the appendix.
25The total stock of housing, including rental housing could also be used. It performs slightly worse in
the estimation of the ‘Irrational’ Model later, only generating an R
2 of 74.63%. The main diﬀerence is the
behavior of the data in the early 1980s when the homeownership rate was falling.
26The data for existing sales of multi-family units begins much later.
27This is not to say that the current level of prices may not inﬂuence the decision of potential buyers
and sellers to enter the market. Indeed, later in the paper evidence is presented that potential buyers are
indeed inﬂuenced by the price level.










Figure 5: Turnover. 2008 is annualized numbers for ﬁrst three quarters. Source: NAR
and Census CPS/HV and SOC.
4.2 Turnover
To map the model into turnover, make the additional assumption that the measure of
sellers, µS, is proportional to the owner stock, µO.28
Assumption 5. The measure of sellers is proportional to the measure of the owner stock
by the factor κ:
µS = κµO.
This assumption allows the data on turnover to be mapped into market tightness. The
assumption means that the true measure of homes for sale in the economy is proportional
to the stock of housing, rather than the number of homes that are currently listed for sale.
From the deﬁnition of the matching function total sales is given by
sales = µSs(θ).
Deﬁne φ = sales/µO. Refer to φ as turnover. Using assumption 5 we get
φ = κs(θ). (10)
28This paper originally started using the measure of homes for sale from the NAR and the new homes
for sale in the Census SOC. It turns out that the total stock of housing ﬁts the data much better. This
diﬀernce is the subject of a note that the author is currently working on.











Furthermore, let φ denote the value for φ when θ = 1, or φ = κA. Additionally, deﬁne
ˆ φt = φt − φ
as the deviation of φ from φ.
Using equations 9 and 11 we get the following equation for the approximate relationship














ˆ φt + zt

pt (12)
Equation (12) is the central equation that we will use to test the rational model.
4.3 Estimation in Levels
The rational model is best estimated by examing the implications for the price level relative























We can then write equation (13) as
ˆ pt = ψˆ φt + zt (15)
Before estimating ψ, the series for ˆ pt must be constructed. In order to do this a stand
must be taken on the trend price level. Using the whole data set from 1975-2007 may
result in an upward bias of the trend growth rate since the data does not include all of the
bust associated with the current boom and bust cycle. Along these lines assume that trend
growth is equal to growth from 1975 to 2003. Note that this aﬀects not only the average
growth rate of prices, but also the value for the mean level of turnover, φ. Restricting the
data for the estimation of trend growth lowers the trend growth rate of prices from 2.12%
to 1.64% and φ from 7.37% to 7.07%. The estimated deviation from trend is shown by
the dark solid line in ﬁgure 6



























Figure 6: House Price Percent Deviation From log-linear trend, Data and Estimated
Model. Source: OFHEO.
Turning to the estimation, the model is estimated using two methods. The ﬁrst method
is standard OLS. The second method is to use GMM and match the volatility of ˆ pt.







the ratio of the standard deviations. The estimation results in
ψOLS = 4.1850 ψGMM = 6.9164.
The ﬁt is shown in ﬁgure 6. Both estimations do a fairly good job of ﬁtting the data. As
could be expected the OLS estimation does not create enough movement in prices. The
failure is that in both estimations prices seem to lag turnover.
One interpretation is that prices are sticky and are slow to adjust to market conditions.
Such an assumption implies that in the decentralized price setting between buyers and
sellers, they behave as if market conditions were equal to last year’s market conditions.
It would seem that the current buyers and sellers would have more information about the
current market conditions than last year’s market conditions. Indeed, in the next section,
the ‘Irrational’ Model is introduced where current buyers and sellers are very well aware of
current market conditions but quite ignorant of past market conditions, instead assuming
that past periods were average market tightness and interpreting prices as a indicator of
the fundamental value of a house.
175 Irrational Model of Search
In the previous sections the fundamental value to owning a house was given by
yt = eztyt
where yt was the trend component and zt was a deviation from trend. The ‘Rational’ Model
of the previous sections assumed that current buyers and sellers29 knew the deviation from
trend. In this section we relax this assumption and instead assume that buyers and sellers
infer it from past prices, plus some noise.
Modelling buyers and sellers inference of zt from past data is a potentially daunting
task. Here two simplifying assumptions are made. The interpretation of the assump-
tions is that current buyers and sellers do indeed make their inference of zt using these
assumptions. First, assume that zt follows a random walk.
Assumption 6. Assume that zt follows a random walk:
zt = zt−1 + εt.
Further, assume that current buyers and seller observe εt but not zt−1.
The random walk assumption implies that buyers and sellers think shocks to the
fundamental value of a house are permanent. Note that this is a permanent shock to
the level of the value of a house, not a shock to the growth rate of the level of a house.
The assumption that εt is observed but that zt is not seems a bit contradictory. It can
be thought of this way: buyers and sellers observe fundamentals such as down payments
and interest rates; they know that the fundamentals aﬀect the value of a house; however,
they do not know the level of a value of a house, just how the fundamentals aﬀect the
change in the level. An analagous environment from growth theory is knowing the change
in TFP, but not the level.
This assumption means that households should use the previous year’s price to make
an inference on zt−1. From equation 12 and using the deﬁnition of ψ, we get
pt ≈
h




logpt − logpt ≈ ψˆ φt + zt (17)
where the approximation log(1 + x) ≈ x for small x has been used. Moving the index for
t back one period, we get the following formula for zt−1:
zt−1 = logpt−1 − logpt−1 − ψˆ φt−1 + ηt−1 (18)
29Throughout the section the emphasis is on current buyers and sellers. The results in the later coun-
terfactual work suggest that potential buyers and sellers who choose not to be current buyers and sellers
behave much more rational than the ‘current’ buyers and sellers.
18where ηt−1 is an error term, possibly for approximation error or mismeasurement.
The central assumption of the paper is now made. The idea is that when determining
zt−1 households irrationally think that ˆ φt−1 = 0.
Assumption 7. Current buyers and sellers assume that
zt−1 = logpt−1 − logpt−1. (19)
This assumption implies that current buyers and sellers mistakenly interpret temporary
price movements from search frictions as a permanent shock to the fundamental value to
a house. This is the idea behind being ‘fooled by search’ in the title of the paper.
Using assumptions 6 and 7 in equation (17) we get
logpt − logpt ≈ ψˆ φt + logpt−1 − logpt−1 + εt. (20)
Noting that logpt−logpt−1 ≈ γ (the trend growth in prices) and logpt−logpt−1 ≈ %∆pt
we can rewrite equation (20) as
%∆pt ≈ γ + ψˆ φt + εt. (21)
Equation (21) is the central equation that will be estimated for the ‘Irrational’ model.
6 Estimation of the Irrational Model
To estimate the irrational model rewrite equation (21) as





Equation (22) is preferred to equation (21) since it does not depend upon the choice of
φ. This distinction does not matter for the estimation of ψ, but it does for the errors εt.
Equation (22) is estimated using standard OLS. The results are:
ψ = 1.9000 γ − ψφ = −0.1196.
The ﬁt is shown in ﬁgure 7. The R2 is 78.77%. This is quite a striking result. It states
that over three-fourths of the annual movements in house prices are explained by turnover.
Of course the model does not explain turnover, taking it as exogenous. However, it does
create a test that any model of house prices needs to deliver: the strong relationship
between turnover and house price growth.
7 Comparing Irrational and Rational Models
The irrational model predicts that turnover should aﬀect price growth while the rational
model predicts that turnover aﬀects the price level relative to trend. The implication of












Figure 7: Annual Real House Price Growth, Data and Estimated Model. Data Source:
OFHEO.
the irrational model is that turnover aﬀects prices permanently while the rational model
predicts that turnover only aﬀects prices temporarily.30 Therefore, the central question of
this paper is: which model ﬁts the data better?
To make this comparison deﬁne the ﬁtted price growth from the irrational model as
%∆pIM
t = γ − ψφ + ψφt













The irrational price series is then detrended using the same estimate from the Rational
Estimation section. The detrended prices series from the irrational and the rational models
are shown in ﬁgure 8. The ﬁt of the models, in terms of R2, is reported in table 1.31 Clearly
the irrational model ﬁts the data much better. We therefore get the main result of the
paper:
30All of these statements are assuming that future turnover is unaﬀected. The later counterfactual
section shows that this is most likely not true.
31When calculating the R
2 the endpoints of the time series (1975 and 2007) are excluded since the
irrational model is estimated in the deviations and matches the endpoints by assumption.
20Irrat. Model Rat. Model: GMM Rat. Model: OLS
R2 80.35% 28.42% 43.94%
Table 1: The ﬁt of the de-trended price level for the rational and irrational models.
Result 1. Turnover is associated with permanent changes in prices rather than temporary.
A way to reconcile such a result with theory is to assume:
Reconciliation 1. Current Buyers and Sellers are aﬀected by turnover when setting cur-
rent prices, but ignore the eﬀect of turnover on past prices.
An implication of this reconciliation is that the change in the current price from cur-
rent search frictions goes on to become a permanent change in prices as future market
participants ignore that the current price change was caused by search frictions, in other
words they are ‘Fooled by Search.’ The next sections generate some counterfactuals and
interpret the estimated coeﬃcient ψ. The counterfactuals will suggest that the choice
of whether to enter the market seems to be inﬂuenced by the errors built up by market
participants being fooled by search. Furthermore, the price setting in the decentralized
market is terribly ineﬃcient: buyers have a much higher weight in creating matches than
they have in bargaining.
8 Alternative Rational Model
An alternative interpretation of the data is that the level of turnover is driven by the
fundamental value of a house and that search frictions have little or no inﬂuence on prices.
In fact there is probably not a way to distinguish such a model from the irrational model
of this paper without a deeper theory. To see this, suppose that current sellers and buyers
use past price and turnover data to ﬁgure out the deviation of fundamental value of a
house from trend, zt−1. Suppose the sellers and buyers believe that search frictions can
aﬀect prices. However, assume that the current sellers and buyers believe that the world
is the rational model. This means that the sellers and buyers do not make assumption 7.
Instead, the sellers and buyers use the rational estimation for zt−1, putting equation (18)
into equation (17), arriving at
logpt − logpt ≈ ψˆ φt + logpt−1 − logpt−1 − ψˆ φt−1 + ηt−1 + εt (23)
where the substitution zt = zt−1 + εt has been inserted. Using the log approximation
log(1 + x) ≈ 1 + x and using the deﬁnition of trend growth, γ, we arrive at
%∆pt ≈ γ + ψ

ˆ φt − ˆ φt−1

+ εt + ηt−1, (24)
which is the rational version of equation (21).















Figure 8: Comparison of Estimated Models to Data Annual Real House Price
Growth, Data and Estimated Models. IM= Irrational Model; RM:OLS= Rational Model
OLS Estimation; RM:GMM=Rational Model GMM Estimation Source: OFHEO.
22In addition, assume that the sellers and buyers believe that the deviation of turnover
from trend, ˆ φt, is proportional to the shock to the deviation of the fundamental value of
house, εt. To make this assumption precise, suppose that
ˆ φt = λεt + νt. (25)
Use equation 25 to substitute for εt in equation 24, arriving at
%∆pt ≈ γ + ψ










Equation 26 can be used to estimate the eﬀects of search friction on prices, ψ > 0,
and to determine whether turnover and the shock to the fundamental value of housing
are correlated, λ > 0. The diﬀerence between equation (26) and the equation used in
estimating the irrational model, equation (22), is the inclusion of a lag for turnover and a
redeﬁnition of the error term.
An OLS regression results in
ψ = 0.4522 and λ = 0.5527.
The ﬁt of the Regression delivers an R2 of 80.45%. The adjusted R2 is 79.80%, an
improvement over the 78.77% of the irrational model, but not by much.
The results imply that the high correlation between house price growth and turnover
can be explained by turnover being correlated with shocks to the fundamental value of
housing. This would imply that the irrational model was false because it was ignoring the
correlation between εt and ˆ φt, and picked up 1/λ in the regression instead of ψ. Another
result is the low value for ψ. The estimate here is only 0.45, while the irrational model
estimated 1.90, a factor of over four diﬀerence. The standard deviation of ˆ φ is only 0.013,
so that the estimate of this section implies that a one standard deviation shock to turnover
would only raise prices by 0.58%, whereas the irrational model estimate implies an increase
of 2.45%.
There are then two competing interpretations of the data:32
1. Rational Interpretation Search frictions have little or no eﬀect on prices. The
strong relationship between price growth and turnover is due to both price growth
and turnover being driven by shocks to the fundamental value of housing.
2. Irrational Interpretation Search frictions do aﬀect pricing. However, when cur-
rent buyers and sellers set prices they ignore the eﬀect of search frictions on past
pricing, so that search frictions aﬀect price growth rather than price levels.
Ultimately a deeper model and a deeper look into the micro data is needed to be able
to distinguish between the two. One way to evaluate the diﬀerent models is to analyze
32Of possibly many interpretations.
23the counterfactuals and other implications of the competing interpretations. This is done
for the Irrational model in the next sections. First the implication of the estimate for ψ
from the Irrational model is addressed, which turns out to depend upon the eﬃciency of
the search process in the housing market.
9 Model Eﬃciency
A key feature of equation (21) from the Irrational model is that ψ determines how much











A key component of ψ is the ratio ω/α, the ratio of the buyer’s weight in bargaining over
the buyer’s weight in producing matches. Those familiar with the search literature will
recognize the importance of the ratio ω/α. As pointed out by Hosios (1990), when this
ratio is unity, the model is eﬃcient.
In search models, there is an externality from the search behavior of an agent. For
instance, when a buyer33 enters the market and starts searching, the buyer helps out
sellers by raising the probability that a seller will make a sale, and hurts other buyers by
lowering the probability that a buyer will be able to make a purchase. In the matching
function, α denotes the weight of buyers in creating matches. When α is greater than a
half, that means that an increase in buyers will cause a larger increase in sales than an
increase in sellers. That is, α denotes the relative importance of buyers in creating sales,
which aﬀects the size of the externality created from a buyer entering the market.
The private return that a buyer gets from a match depends upon the bargaining weight
ω. Speciﬁcally, the Nash Solution sets the surplus that a buyer gets from a match equal
to ω of the combined surplus of a buyer and a seller to a match. When ω = α, the private
return to a buyer from creating a match equals the societal return from a buyer entering
the market. Therefore, in search models there is an ineﬃciency if α 6= ω.
We can use the estimate from the Irrational model to make an inference about ω/α.









In the model, sales over a time period of length ∆ is given by
sales = ∆κµOAθα,
where the assumption that the total amount of sellers is proportional to the owner stock
via µS = κµO has been inserted. If we set ∆A to be a year, then average annual turnover
33Technically, a strictly positive measure of buyers in the model.




where assumption 2 has been used setting θ = 1. In equation (28) the term (r + A)/A is










where the deﬁnition of φ
A








where rA is the annual discount factor, rA = r∆A.
In the data φ
A
= 0.0717, where once again the average is over the years 1976 to 2003.
From the Irrational model estimates we get ψ = 1.9. Therefore conditional on values for












This implies a very ineﬃcient housing market with buyers bargaining weight being one-
ﬁfth of their weight on producing matches. Alternatively, we can ask what value for rA
reconciles eﬃciency in the search part of the housing market (again assuming κ = 1, an
upper bound). This results in
rA = 45.47%.
This is a very high value. Of course it could be indicative of the very high impatience
that buyers and sellers may have once they have decided to enter the market.34 However
increasing patience by a factor of ten seems a bit much.
To summarize, the Irrational model estimates imply that the search part of the housing
market is ineﬃcient by an order of magnitude. Buyers have a much higher weight on
making matches than they do in the surplus from a match. The bargaining protocol has
not been modelled in this paper. However, the results here indicate that sellers have an
ineﬃciently high weight in the bargaining process. This could be indicative of a more
complex model of incomplete information where buyers know market conditions better
than sellers. It could also be for this heavy weight on sellers in the bargaining process
that prices seem irrationally backward looking.
34Throughout the whole paper the assumption has been that buyers and sellers have the same discount
factor. Investigating a model with heterogeneity would be interesting.
2510 Counterfactuals
The Irrational model is ineﬃcient because current buyers and sellers interpret past price
changes as a permanent change in the fundamental value of a house instead of temporary
changes induced by temporary demand shocks and search frictions. In this section coun-
terfactuals are constructed where buyers and sellers correctly take into account search
frictions on past prices. Assume that buyers and sellers estimate zt−1 via
zt−1 = logpt−1 − logpt−1 − ψˆ φt−1. (32)
This is equivalent to dropping assumption 7. An implicit assumption in using this coun-
terfactual is that turnover is not related to the fundamental value, zt. In reality turnover
probably moves in relation to zt. With that in mind the results of this section should be
thought of as an upper bound on the diﬀerence between the data and the counterfactual.
Ultimately a model with endogenous turnover is desired. Nevertheless, the results of this
section are quite enlightening.
To construct the counterfactual, subtract ψˆ φt−1 from the annual price growth in the
data, or
%∆pCF
t = %∆pt − ψˆ φt−1, (33)
where ‘CF’ denotes counterfactual. In constructing the counterfactual, a value for φ must
be used. In doing this, the same value is used as when constructing the trend in the
estimation of the rational model, so that φ is equal to the mean from 1975 to 2003. The
counterfactual price growth is shown in ﬁgure 9. Inspection of ﬁgure 9 shows that price
growth should have been less volatile. In addition, prices should have fallen earlier in
the downturns and recovered earlier. In regards to the volatility, the standard deviation
of price growth in the data is 2.79% while the standard deviation of the counterfactual
is 2.29%. Therefore, the irrational ineﬃciency raises the volatility of annual real price
growth by 21.56%.
10.1 The Housing Bubble
Of particular interest is the potential contribution of the irrationality assumption to the
housing bubble of the past decade. In the introducton of the paper, ﬁgure 2 plots the
counterfactual price path, the data, and a trend, beginning in 1998 where the 1998 real
house price had been normalized to one. In the data, house prices peaked in 2006, after
appreciating 45.26% since 1998. The counterfactual predicts that house prices should
have peaked one year earlier in 2005, and that the peak should have been signiﬁcanlty
lower, only peaking at an increase of 21.42%. Therefore, the irrationality assumption
is responsible for an extra increase of house prices of 23.84%, or 52.67% of the housing
bubble. If we take out the trend growth, the data peaks at 25.19% above trend, while the
counterfactual peaks at 6.93% above trend. Relative to trend, the ineﬃciency can explain
72.48% of the housing bubble, almost three-fourths.













Figure 9: Annual Real House Price Growth, Data and Counterfactual from Estimated
Model where the Irrational Assumption 7 has been removed. Data Source: OFHEO.
Note that this result is not explaining the housing bubble. No attempt has been made
to explain the ultimate driving force, which is the increase in demand that shows up
in higher turnover and higher prices. The model of this paper is an ampliﬁcation device.
The counterfactual states that given the increase in demand, house prices should only have
increased by 6.93% in real terms relative to trend. The ineﬃciency, from ignoring search
frictions on past prices, magniﬁes the eﬀect of the increased demand on prices, resulting
in prices rising an additional 18.26% relative to trend to reach the 25.19% increase relative
to trend seen in the data.
The estimated shocks, εt, have some very interesting results over the housing bubble.
To see this it is good to go back to 1988 and examine the counterfactual price path
relative to trend. Figure 10 shows the detrended price path from data, turnover and some
counterfactual price paths. The turnover series is deviations from the mean, re-scalad to
be on roughly the same magnitude as the deviations from trend for the price data. The
dashed blue line denoted ‘CF’ is the detrended counterfactual price path with assumption 7
removed. The last two lines marked ‘Eps’ and ‘Search’ break down the counterfactual into
the part coming from the shocks, ‘Eps’, and the part coming from search frictions, ‘Search.’
The dotted (or vertical marks) black line, marked ‘Eps’, is the accumulation of the errors
(since 1988) from equation (22) in the estimation of the irrational model–this would be the
detrended counterfactual price path if turnover was held ﬁxed at its stationary level. Last
the dashed-dot blue line marked ‘Search’ is the detrended counterfactual price path with
the irrationality assumption removed and the errors terms set to zero. This line would be
27the price path from only the search frictions if households were rational. The sum of the
‘Eps’ line and the ‘Search’ line is equal to the ‘CF’ line.
Figure 10 tells an interesting story. First, turnover falls considerably preceding the
1990-1991 recession. This causes the data price path to start to decline relative to trend.
The counterfactual price path also declines, but by much less. This is because the coun-
terfactual price path should only be decreasing based upon the change in turnover, not
the level, as it does in the data. Turnover bottoms out in 1991, but because it remains
below trend, the price in the data continues to fall. However, as turnover rises after the
bottom in 1991, the counterfactual price path starts to rise as turnover increases. But the
price in the data keeps on falling, relative to trend, until 1997 when turnover ﬁnally gets
back to its stationary level. From 1988 to 1997 the ‘Search’ price path is essentially the
counterfactual price path. This is indicative of the ‘Eps’ price path essentially being zero
over this time period, as it is.
Something quite interesting starts to happen in 1998. As turnover is starting to move
above trend, the shocks, the εts, start to go positive. This implies that prices are rising
more than the model would predict, even though since turnover is above trend, prices are
already rising at a fairly good clip. The accumulation of the εt can be interpreted as a
permanent shock to the fundamental value of a house. This unobserved permanent shock
to the fundamental of a house reaches its peak in 2003, and remains high until about 2005
(as shown by the ‘Eps’ line). After 2005 all of this fundamental shock is eroded and goes
back to where it was in 1988.35
This rise in the fundamental value to a house is quite intriguing. It seems to mirror
quite well the ideas of a loose monetary policy beginning in 1998. This is consistent with
the Federal Reserve under Greenspan not tightening enough at the end of the boom, and
then keeping policy too loose in the recovery. Over this time period the counterfactual
price path departs from the ‘Search’ counterfactual path. In fact, a rational search model
would predict a fall in prices from the fall in turnover around the 2000 recession, however
the counterfactual actually rises from the εt shocks. Furthermore, it is after the peak
in the ‘Eps’ line that we see turnover really take oﬀ. In a rational model, the increase
in turnover should have only caused a slight increase in the price level (since the ‘Eps’
line was also diminishing) as shown by the slight increase the counterfactual line. But to
the contrary, the irrational model implies that that households take the temporary rise
in turnover and treat it as permanent, so that as turnover remains high, prices keep on
rising. In essence, the irrational assumption is an ampliﬁcation eﬀect that magniﬁes the
eﬀect of the loose monetary policy on house prices. It is the irrationality ineﬃciency that
potentially makes the error in monetary policy be quite painful.
35Note that the εt are from the whole estimation from 1976 to 2007, so there is no reason for them to
necessarily sum to zero between 1988 and 2007.


















Figure 10: Detrended Real House Prices, Turnover (re-scaled deviations from mean),
and Counterfactuals from Estimated Model where the Irrational Assumption 7 has been
removed. For deﬁnition of diﬀerent counterfactuals see the text; Source: OFHEO.















Figure 11: 1975-1988 Housing Cycle: Detrended Real House Prices, and Counterfactuals
from Estimated Model where the Irrational Assumption 7 has been removed. For deﬁnition
of diﬀerent counterfactuals see the text; Source: OFHEO.
10.2 Boom and Bust of 1975-1988
From 1975 to 1988 there was a boom, bust and recovery of the housing market. Figure
11 plots the detrended data series and the counterfactuals. Once again we see that prices
increased too much, illustrating the ampliﬁcation eﬀect from the irrational assumption.
Of particular interest however is the behavior of the ‘Search’ counterfactual relative to
the straight up counterfactual where the irrational assumption has been removed.36 We
see that these deviate from each other, with the search counterfactual implying prices
higher than the standard counterfactual. The diﬀerence is due to the error terms. These
are collected in the counterfactual ‘Eps.’ Notice that the ‘Eps’ line falls up to 1982 and
then returns to zero by 1988.37 This pattern seems consistent with stories of inﬂation
expectation errors. From 1976 to 1982 inﬂation was rising, and then it started to fall.
Using the forcaster’s inﬂation expectations from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve, a
series can be constructed of inﬂation forecast errors. The Philly Fed survey calculates a
quarterly estimation of annual inﬂation expectations for the GDP Deﬂator. For instance,
in the ﬁrst quarter of 1974 the forecasters made a prediction for inﬂation for the next year,
36Remember from the previous subsection that the ‘Search’ counterfactual is the counterfactual with
the shocks removed, leaving only the movements from changes in turnover.
37Once again, the error terms are estimated over the entire sample from 1976 to 2007, so they do not
necessarily have to sum to zero from 1976 to 1988.
30essentially a prediction for the change in the GDP Deﬂator between the ﬁrst quarter of
1974 and the ﬁrst quarter of 1975. Let the forecast error be the diﬀerence between the
forecast and the realization. Precisely:
πerr
t = πt − π
f
t (34)
where πt is the realized inﬂation at time t, π
f
t is the forecast of time t inﬂation (made
one year before), and πerr
t is the forecast error. When the forecast error is positive, that
means inﬂation was higher than expected. A higher than expected inﬂation will cause
real prices to fall. Thus, in the estimation of the irrational model, if inﬂation is higher
than anticipated, this would create negative errors. Figure 12 plots the accumulation of
negative the inﬂation forecast errors up to time t, alongside the accumulation of the house
price shocks, the ε errors from the estimation of the Irrational Model. The two series are
almost on top of each other. There is just an issue with the timing of the forecast errors
going from positive to negative. Therefore the diﬀerence between the counterfactual and
the ‘search’ counterfactual in ﬁgure 11 can be explained by inﬂation forecast errors.38 This
implies that the relevant counterfactual is the ‘search’ counterfactual, not the straight up
counterfactual that includes the error terms.
Using the search counterfactual as the relevant counterfactual delivers an interesting
picture. Figure 13 shows the log real house price series and the search counterfactual, this
time not detrended. The ﬁgure also plots turnover (recentered and rescaled to ﬁt nicely
on the picture). Initially the search counterfactual rises above the data–this is due to the
inﬂation forecast errors. However, in 1978 the data catches up with the counterfactual
and soars above it. This is the ampliﬁcation device in the irrational model. Of interest
however is the behavior of the turnover series. Once the house price in the data catches
up the counterfactual, we see turnover fall. We the see the peak in the house price in the
data and then a fall in house prices. In fact, real house prices keep on falling until the real
price level is back at the counterfactual price level. We also see that turnover falls until
the price in the data is driven down to the counterfactual price level. After the nadir in
turnover, turnover and the counterfactual price level recover, while the price level in data
lags behind in its recovery.
The story painted in ﬁgure 13 is quite informative. It suggests that the buyers who
are thinking about whether to enter the housing market are quite rational. They seem
to have a good understanding of the diﬀerence between the price level in the data and
the counterfactual. Therefore, it seems to be just the current buyers and sellers who are
38These results suggest that for making nominal price growth real, the relevant inﬂation measure should
not be realized inﬂation but forecast inﬂation. In fact, using the inﬂation forecasts from the forecasters
gives a much better ﬁt for the Irrational model, raising the R
2 from 78.77% to 88.52%. This is also the
subject of work under progress. In this model there are continuing inﬂation errors in the 1990s that have
caused housing prices to be overvalued–inﬂation kept on coming in lower than expected, raising the price
of housing relative to the GDP bundle. Brunnermeier and Julliard (2007) have focused on the eﬀects of
money illusion on housing bubbles. Their focus is not on houses being mispriced in decentralized trade,
but rather on households not knowing the true inﬂation rate to calculate the user costs of owning a home.
























































Figure 12: 1975-1988 Housing Cycle Accumulated Estimation errors from the Irra-
tional Model, ε, and Negative the Accumulated Inﬂation Forecast Errors from Professional
Forecasters; Source: Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank and BEA.






















































Figure 13: 1975-1988 Housing Cycle Turnover (right scale), Log Real House Prices,
and Search Counterfactual from Estimated Model where Assumption 7 has been removed.
Source: OFHEO.
32being irrational, and not the other potential buyers and sellers who are choosing to not
be buyers and sellers. This could also be a function of sellers being the irrational ones
but also having a lot of weight in the bargaining process. An implication of the 1975-1988
boom, bust and recovery is that turnover (and housing demand) keeps on falling until
the real house price returns to the counterfactual. In addition, the housing price will also
overshoot, falling too much below trend (or remaining ﬂat in real terms as in the 1975-1988
episode). The next section uses this observation to make a statement about what can be
expected about the depth and length of the current housing bust.
11 Projections for Current Housing Crisis
The results of the previous section can be used to make a projection for the size of the
bust and eventual recovery in the current housing crisis. The previous section showed that
the housing market did not start to recover until the real house price in the data fell down
to the level of the counterfactual real house price. We can use this observation to think
about what time series for turnover we can expect going forward in the current crisis. The
idea is to ﬁnd a path for turnover that drives the real price level in the data down to the
real counterfactual price level. Figure 14 plots the percentage deviation of turnover from
its long term level39 for the 1982 crisis and the current crisis, where year zero is the peak
of turnover for each housing boom. In addition the ﬁgure plots the percentage deviation
for new home turnover for the current crisis.40 We see very similar patterns for turnover.
A natural question to ask is whether the current crisis will be as bad as the 1982 crisis.
To answer this question, going foward from 2008, set turnover equal to its value during
the 82 crisis. This makers turnover in 2009 equal to to the low point of the 82 crisis, or the
year 4 in ﬁgure 14 and then it follows the 1982 path for the subsequent years. This path
for turnover can then be fed into the model to make predictions for the real house price
series in the data and for the counterfactual. The question being asked is: Can this path
of turnover drive the real house price down to the counterfactual house price? The answer
is negative, the price that the model predicts never reaches the predicted counterfactual
price, the recovery happens too soon.
To give some idea of what type of path for turnover can drive the real house price
down to the counterfactual, suppose that the percentage deviation in turnover falls down
to the lowest level from the 1982 crisis, stays there from 2009-2011, and then follows the
1982 recovery. This roughly implies that the housing market stagnates for three years
at the level of the nadir of the 1982 crisis. The forecasted price path and the forecasted
counterfactual price path are shown in ﬁgure 15 along with a series for turnover that has
been re-scaled and re-centered. This magnitude of a housing bust is able to drive the real
housing price down to the counterfactual. Under this hypothesis, real house prices fall
39The mean from 1976 to 2003
40That is, new home sales over the owner stock of housing.
































Figure 14: Turnover, percentage deviation from mean, years from peak of cycle for 1978
and 2005 housing bubbles. Source: NAR and Census.
until 2011. At that point real house prices will have fallen an additional 11% from their
2008 level and just over 15% from the peak in 2006, going back to the levels seen in 2002
and 2003. Of course this is the results for real prices. Nominal prices are probably more
important, and that depends upon what happens to inﬂation or deﬂation in the coming
years. The ﬁgure also marks the turning points in turnover. Notice how they line up with
the dates when the house price in the data and the counterfactual cross.
The projections of this section imply quite rough times still to come for the housing
market. The results from the counterfactuals in the 1975-1988 boom and bust suggest that
turnover falls until real prices stabilize, and that prices recover very slowly. One way that
turnover could recover more quickly is if prices fall more quickly that the estimates from
the irrational model. Such a larger (downward) movement in prices would be bringing
the housing market closer to the eﬃcient market. This would also bring the real house
price down to the counterfactual more quickly. Essentially, the quicker the house price
can be brought in line with the counterfactual, the better. This is equivalent to trying to
overcome the ineﬃciencies in the housing market that this paper has highlighted. Once
the housing market is stabilized then the credit market can stabilize since the stabilization
of the housing market would seem to be essential to stop the rising foreclosures.




































































Figure 15: Predicton for the Current Crisis in the Housing Market Hypothetical
paths for Real House Price and Counterfactual, assuming Turnover falls to the bottom of
1982 crisis for 2009-2011, and then follows 1982 recovery. Dashed lines are forecasts.
3512 Conclusion
This paper has highlighted an observation from the data: in aggregate data for the United
States Housing Market there is a very tight relationship between turnover and price growth
rather than the price level. The signiﬁcance between growth and levels is important since
it is the distinction between a temporary movement in demand causing a permanent price
change versus a temporary price change. One way to explain the data is to assume that
movements in demand are related to permanent changes to the fundamental value of a
house. However, if we believe that search frictions aﬀect house prices, then we face a
contradiction between theory and data: theory predicts that the eﬀects of search frictions
on house prices from temporary movements in demand should be temporary, while the data
suggests it is permanent.
This paper has oﬀered one possible resolution to the contradiction: buyers and sellers
ignore the eﬀects of search frictions on past prices, instead interpreting all past prices as
the best signal of the fundamental value of a house. This behavioral assumption implies
that when bargaining over house prices, current buyers and sellers (who are aﬀected by
search frictions) end up bargaining over price growth rather than the price level since they
treat past prices as a type of anchor. The change in prices becomes permanent when
future buyers and sellers interpret the change in prices as a change to the fundamental
value of a house. In this way buyers and sellers are ‘fooled by search.’
Such a behavioral assumption seems related to Shiller’s observation that households
have a very poor understanding of levels, dealing much better with the rate of change of
prices. The assumption implies that a shock that raises demand causes an increase in the
growth rate of prices, rather than an increase in the level of prices. If we accept Shiller’s
hypothesis that there are positive feedbacks from growth rates, then shocks to demand
(positive or negative) can cause further shocks to demand reinforcing the growth rate.
The behavioral assumption was inserted into a textbook search model, linearized, and
estimated using standard OLS where each annual observation in the data was treated
as a observation of the stationary continuous time model. The counterfactuals of the
estimated model imply that over half of the increase of house prices during the housing
bubble starting in 1998 can be explained by the ampliﬁcation mechanism of search frictions
and the ignorance of search frictions on past prices. When trend price growth is removed,
the model explains almost three-fourths of the bubble.
The estimated model also implies that the search part of the housing market is in-
eﬃcient (this is aside from the ineﬃciecny from the behavioral assumption). Buyers do
not have enough bargaining power relative to their contribution to creating matches. This
suggests that buyers’ actions are responsible for sales, but when it comes down to negotiat-
ing, sellers have the power. This seems to follow most people’s understanding of the house
market. This suggests reforms that allow sellers’ eﬀorts to add to match creation and
that limit the power of sellers in negotiation would improve the eﬃciency of the housing
market.
36The model of this paper takes turnover as exogenous and explains prices. Ultimately
research should have both endogenous prices and turnover. However, the paper does
provide guidance to explain turnover. There is evidence that buyers who are choosing
to not enter the market do respond to the level. In the counterfactual of the estimated
model, whenever houses are overvalued, turnover falls, while when houses are undervalued
turnover is increasing. This suggests that renters who are thinkig about entering the
housing market are aﬀected by levels, consistent with down payment stories. A model
that combines the ampliﬁcation mechanisms in Stein (1995) and Ortalo-Magn´ e and Rady
(2006), search, and renters that face down payment constraints seems quite intuitive. The
tight correlation between price growth and turnover would then serve as a benchmark for
a model to hit.
The estimated model also provides evidence that there was an increase in the funda-
mental value of houses starting in 1998, rising through 2003-2005, and then falling back
down to the pre-1998 levels by 2007. This seems quite consistent with stories of loose mon-
etary policies under Greenspan. In fact the author remembers how everyone started really
thinking about getting into housing when the Federal Reserve lowered rates in reaction
to the 1998 Asian Crisis. Any eﬀect this had on turnover, would create an ampliﬁcation
on prices if we accept the assumptions of this paper. This implies much larger eﬀects
from monetary policy on prices than just the channel of interest rates on the fundamental
values of houses. In fact, the eﬀect of demand on the growth rate of prices could lead to
‘Irrational Exuberance.’
More work needs to be done to examine how pervasive the relationship between price
growth, price levels, and turnover is. Speciﬁcally, the results at the regional, metropolitan,
and in other countries are needed. What is signiﬁcant is whether a measure of a sales rate
is related with price growth or price levels.
To ﬁnish up, if we accept the assumptions of this paper, own way to get around the
ineﬃciency from the behavioral assumption would be to create price indices that take out
the change in house prices that is due to a combination of changes in market tightness
and search frictions.41 Such an index would be model speciﬁc, but could better inform
the public to better price illiquid real assets that trade in decentralized markets, such as
houses. This could help to mitigate ‘Irrational Exuberance.’
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